phil stat

A non-statistically significant difference strengthens or confirms a null, says Fisher (1955)

RA_Fisher,_repairing_mousetraps

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In Fisher (1955) [from “the triad”]: “it is a fallacy, so well known as to be a standard example, to conclude from a test of significance that the null hypothesis thereby established; at most it may be said to be confirmed or strengthened.”

I just noticed the last part of this sentence, which I think I’ve missed in a zillion readings, or else it didn’t seem very important. People erroneously think Fisherian tests can infer nothing from non-significant results, but I hadn’t remembered that Fisher himself made it blatant–even while he is busy yelling at N-P for introducing the Type 2 error!  Neyman and Pearson use power-analytic reasoning to determine how well the null is “confirmed”. If POW(μ’) is high, then a non-statistically significant result indicates μ≤ μ’.

Categories: phil stat | 2 Comments

Rejected Post: 3 Msc. Kvetches on the Blog Bagel Circuit

mayo-at-deskIn the past week, I’ve kvetched over at 3 of the blogs on my blog bagel (instead of using the time to work). Here are the main ones, you can follow up on their blogs if you wish:

I.  I made a brief comment on a blatant error in Mark Chang’s treatment of my Birnbaum disproof on  Xi’an’s Og. Chang is responding to Christian Robert’s critical review of his book, Paradoxes in Scientific Inference (2013)

Mayo Says: December 27, 2012 at 9:08 am (actually posted Dec.26,~1:30 a.m.)

I have only gotten to look at Mark Chang’s book a few days ago. I have many concerns regarding his treatment of points from Mayo and Spanos (2010), in particular the chapters by Cox and Mayo (2010) and Mayo (2010). Notably, having set out, nearly verbatim (but without quotes), my first variation of Birnbaum’s argument (Mayo 2010, 309), Chang takes, as evidence that “Mayo’s disproof is faulty”, assertions that I make only concerning the second variation of the Birnbaum argument (310-11).  Chang has written (Chang, 138) the first version in detail, but obviously doesn’t understand it. The problem with the first version is that the two premises cannot both be true at the same time (the crucial term shifts its meaning in the two premises). The second formulation, by contrast, allows both premises to be true. I label the two premises of the second variation as (1) and (2)’.  The problem in the second formulation is: “The antecedent of premise (1) is the denial of the antecedent of premise (2)’.”(Mayo 2010, 311). (Note the prime on (2)’. )These are both conditional claims, hence they have antecedents. Chang gives this quote, but has missed its reference. I might mention that I don’t see the relevance of Chang’s point about sufficiency to either variations of Birnbaum’s proof (bottom para, Chang 138).

A less informal and clearer treatment of my Birnbaum argument may be found in a recent paper: On the Birnbaum Argument for the Strong Likelihood Principle. Continue reading

Categories: danger, Misc Kvetching, phil stat | 2 Comments

Stat on a Hot Tin Roof (statistical theater of the absurd reblog)

Statistical Theater of the Absurd: “Stat on a Hot Tin Roof”? (Rejected Post Feb 20, 2012)

Dear Reader: Not having been at this very long, I don’t know if it’s common for bloggers to collect a pile of rejected posts that one thinks better of before posting. Well, I began to generate such posts, and eventually created a blog within a blog (first on private). Some initially rejected posts were even rejected for the “rejected posts” blog, but most are here. It seems fitting to reblog my very first “rejected post” as my very first rejected post, particularly since we have recently discussed George Barnard.  Sincerely, D. G. Mayo

Originally posted on February 20, 2012 by Mayo Edit

Did you ever consider how some of the colorful exchanges among better-known names in statistical foundations could be the basis for high literary drama in the form of one-act plays (even if appreciated by only 3-7 people in the world)? (Think of the expressionist exchange between Bohr and Heisenberg in Michael Frayn’s play Copenhagen, except here there would be no attempt at all to popularize—only published quotes and closely remembered conversations would be included, with no attempt to create a “story line”.)  Somehow I didn’t think so. But rereading some of Savage’s high-flown praise of Birnbaum’s “breakthrough” argument (for the Likelihood Principle) today, I was swept into a “(statistical) theater of the absurd” mindset. Continue reading

Categories: phil stat, rejected posts | Tags: , , , | Leave a comment

Particle Physics is Bad Science?

I suppose this is somewhat of a joke from the ISBA, prompted by Dennis Lindley–right?– but as I accord the actual degree of jokiness to be only ~33%, I’m raising it on my Msc Kvetching page.  Lindley (according to O’Hagan) wonders why scientists require so high a level of statistical significance before claiming to have evidence of a Higgs boson.  It is asked: “Are the particle physics community completely wedded to frequentist analysis?  If so, has anyone tried to explain what bad  science that is?”
Bad science?   I’d really like to understand what these representatives from the ISBA would recommend, if there is even a shred of seriousness here (or is Lindley just peeved that significance levels are getting so much press in connection with so important a discovery in particle physics?)
Well, read the letter and see what you think. Continue reading

Categories: phil sci, phil stat | Tags: , | 1 Comment

Statistical Theater of the Absurd: “Stat on a Hot Tin Roof”? (Rejected Post Feb 20)

Dear Reader: Not having been at this very long, I don’t know if it’s common for bloggers to collect a pile of rejected posts that one thinks better of before posting. Well, here’s one that belongs up in a “rejected post” page (and will be tucked away soon enough), but since we have so recently posted the FisherNeymanPearson “triad”, the blog-elders of Elba have twisted my elbow (repeatedly) to share this post, from back in the fall of 2011, London. Sincerely, D. Mayo

Egon Pearson on a Gate (by D. Mayo)

Did you ever consider how some of the colorful exchanges among better-known names in statistical foundations could be the basis for high literary drama in the form of one-act plays (even if appreciated by only 3-7 people in the world)? (Think of the expressionist exchange between Bohr and Heisenberg in Michael Frayn’s play Copenhagen, except here there would be no attempt at all to popularize—only published quotes and closely remembered conversations would be included, with no attempt to create a “story line”.)  Somehow I didn’t think so. But rereading some of Savage’s high-flown praise of Birnbaum’s “breakthrough” argument (for the Likelihood Principle) today, I was swept into a “(statistical) theater of the absurd” mindset. Continue reading

Categories: phil stat, rejected posts | Tags: , | Leave a comment

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